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Abstract: This study aims to determine the effect of good corporate governance 
(institutional ownership, managerial ownership, independent board of 
commissioners and audit committees) on firm value in property & real estate sector 
companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. In addition, this study also aims to 
determine whether earnings management can be used as a moderating variable in 
the model. The research design carried out is a causal relationship research with a 
quantitative approach. The sample in this study were 26 property & real estate 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012 to 2018. The type of 
data used in this study is secondary data. The technique of determining the sample 
using purposive sampling. And data analysis techniques using multiple linear 
regression analysis and interaction testing (moderating) conducted with the help of 
Eviews 9 software. The results in this study indicate that partially institutional 
ownership, independent boards of commissioners and audit committees have a 
positive and significant effect on firm value. As well as other results that show that 
earnings management is not a moderating variable in the effect of institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership, independent commissioners and audit 
committees on firm value in property & real estate sector companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Firm value is reflected in the company’s stock price, the higher the stock price 
signals the increase in firm value. The higher firm value will attract the attention of 
investors to invest their shares in the company. 
The concept of GCG also concerns the company's structure, which consists of the 
elements of the GMS, directors and commissioners. It is expected that with good 
corporate governance there will be good governance between work mechanisms, 
division of tasks, authority, and harmonious responsibilities, both internally and 
externally with the aim of increasing the value of the company in the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders. Some mechanisms of good corporate governance 
include manifesting managerial ownership, institutional ownership, the number of 
independent commissioners and independent audit committees. The relationship of 
GCG with firm value proves that corporate governance has an effect on firm value, 
but not all components of corporate governance have significant and positive effect 
on firm value. 
Earnings management is a common phenomenon that occurs in companies. 
Practices undertaken to influence this rate of profit can occur legally or illegally. 
This legal practice in earnings management means that efforts to influence earnings 
figures do not conflict with the rules for preparing financial statements, namely by 
taking advantage of opportunities to make accounting estimates, making changes 
to accounting methods, and shifting periods of income or expenses. Whereas illegal 
earnings management practices are carried out in ways that are contrary to the rules 
of preparing financial statements, namely by reporting fictitious income or expense 
transactions by adding (marking up) and reducing (marking down) the value of the 
transaction, or possible by not reporting a number of transactions, so that it will 
generate profits at a certain value / level. 
 
 
Figure 1. Value of property and real estate companies in 2012-2018 
 
As we can see from the graphic above an increase and decrease in the value 
of property and real estate companies in 2012-2018. Property and real estate 
business is a business that is known to have the characteristics of rapidly changing 
(volatile) competition that is persistent and complex. Firm value is reflected in the 
market value (stock price) and the book value of the company. The value of wealth 
can be seen through the development of the company’s stock price (common stock) 
in the market. In this case, the value of shares can reflect a company’s financial 
investment and dividend policy. Firm value can be affected by managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, dividend policy, leverage, firm size and also 
affected by financial performance, good corporate governance. 
In developed and developing countries, the development and property and real 
estate businesses are experiencing rapid growth, this has also happened in 
Indonesia. Property and real estate companies’ shares in Indonesia began to be in 
demand when in 2000, it also led to many companies listing on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange so that company shares could be bought by investors. The property 
development that has increased considerably indicates that there has been a 
significant economic improvement towards a better future. Economic growth in 
Indonesia, which grew steadily until 2016 but declined in 2017. This is also what 
makes researchers interested in making property and real estate companies as 
objects to be studied. So that researchers intend to conduct research under the title 
“The Effect of Good Corporate Governance Implementation on Firm Value with 
Earnings Management as a Moderating Variable in Property & Real Estate 
Companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.” 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1. Agency Theory 
In agency theory, it is stated that there are two interrelated individuals, 
namely agents and principals. This theory describes the relationship between 
shareholders as shareholders and management as agents. social and economic 
fields. 
 
2.2. Signaling Theory 
Signal theory is based on the assumption that the information received by 
each party is not the same. In other words, signal theory is related to information 
asymmetry. Signal theory shows the information asymmetry between company 
management and parties with an interest in information. 
 
2.3. Good Corporate Governance 
The principle of corporate governance that is applied in Indonesia is Good 
Corporate Governance. The Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) 
defines good corporate governance as a system that directs and controls a company. 
GCG is a set of regulations that establish relationships between shareholders, 
management, creditors, government, employees and other internal and external 
stakeholders with respect to their rights and obligations, or in other words systems 
that direct and control the company ((FCGI, 2000). 
Corporate governance arises because there is a separation between ownership and 
corporate control, or often known as agency problems. The agency problem in the 
relationship between capital owners and managers is how difficult it is for owners 
to ensure that the funds invested are not taken over or invested in profitable projects 
so that they do not bring returns. Therefore, corporate governance is needed to 
reduce agency problems between owners and managers. And the purpose of 
Corporate Governance is to increase value for the shareholders. 
 
2.4. Institutional Ownership 
In conjunction with the monitor function, institutional investors are believed 
to have the ability to monitor management actions better than individual investors. 
Institutional ownership represents a source of power that can be used to support or 
vice versa on the existence of management. 
 
2.5. Managerial Ownership 
In accounting theory, earnings management is largely determined by the 
motivation of company managers. Different motivations will result in different 
amounts of earnings management, such as managers who are both shareholders and 
managers who are not shareholders. These two things will affect earnings 
management, because the ownership of a manager will participate in determining 
policies and decision making on the accounting methods applied to the company 
being managed. 
 
 
 
2.6. Number of Board of Commissioners 
In addition to managerial ownership, the role of the board of commissioners 
is also expected to improve earnings quality by limiting the level of earnings 
management through the monitoring function of financial reporting. The effect of 
the number of board of commissioners on company performance has gotten mixed 
results. 
 
2.7. Audit committee 
In accordance with Kep.29 / PM / 2004, the audit committee is a committee 
formed by the board of commissioners to carry out the oversight of the management 
of the company. The existence of an audit committee is very important for the 
management of the company. The audit committee is a new component in the 
company’s control system. In addition, the audit committee is considered as a 
liaison between shareholders and the board of commissioners with management in 
handling control issues. Based on the JSX Circular, SE-008 / BEJ / 12-2001, the 
membership of the audit committee consists of at least three people including the 
chair of the audit committee. There are only one member of this committee from 
the commissioner, the committee member who is from the commissioner is an 
independent company listed commissioner and is also the chairman of the audit 
committee. Other members who are not independent commissioners must come 
from independent external parties. 
 
2.8. Firm Value 
A company is said to have good value if the company’s performance is also 
good. The value of a company can be reflected in the price of its shares. If the value 
of the shares is high, it can be said that the value of the company is also good. 
Because the company's main goal is to increase the firm value through increasing 
the prosperity of the owners or shareholders. 
 
2.9. Earning Management 
Earnings management is the selection of accounting policies by management 
from existing accounting standards and can naturally maximize their utility and or 
market value of the company. Understanding of earnings management can be 
divided into two perspectives. First, earnings management is seen as the 
opportunistic behavior of managers to maximize their utility in dealing with 
compensation contracts, debt contracts, and political costs. Second, earnings 
management is seen from the perspective of efficient contracting, where earnings 
management gives managers a flexibility to protect themselves and the company in 
anticipating unexpected events for the benefit of the parties involved in the contract. 
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2.10. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework in this study is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.11. Hypothesis 
The greater the institutional ownership, the more efficient the use of company 
assets and is also expected to act as a deterrent to waste and manipulation of 
earnings carried out by management so that it can increase the value of the 
company. Institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm value. With 
institutional ownership, the supervision function will run effectively and make 
management more careful in obtaining and managing loans (debts), which can 
result in a decrease in firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm value in property 
& real estate companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
Mechanisms to overcome agency conflicts within a company include 
increasing insider ownership. The increasing stock owned by managers through 
managerial ownership will motivate management performance because they feel 
they have a stake in the good company in making decisions and are responsible for 
decisions taken because they participate as shareholders of the company so that 
management performance is getting better and affecting the increase in firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm value in the 
property & real estate sector companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
The increasing number of independent directors indicates that there will be 
an improved oversight and coordination function. The more members of the 
independent commissioner, the higher the level of integrity of the supervision of 
the board of directors produced, so that decisions to be taken by the board of 
directors are more representative of the interests of other stakeholders than the 
interests of the majority shareholders and the impact will be better on the firm value. 
Institutional Ownership (X1) 
 
Firm Value (Y) 
 
Earning Management (Z) 
 
Number of Commissioner (X3) 
 
Managerial Ownership (X2) 
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Hypothesis 3: The number of independent commissioners has a positive effect on 
firm value in the property & real estate sector companies on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
 
The audit committee has a role in evaluating internal processes and controls 
in the company so as to produce quality reporting. This shows that the existence of 
the audit committee in the company contributes to the results of the quality of 
financial statements. The audit and evaluation function by the audit committee will 
reduce the level of management fraud and increase investor confidence in the 
company so that it will ultimately increase firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The audit committee has a positive effect on firm value in the property 
& real estate sector companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
Institutional ownership has the ability to control management through an 
effective monitoring process so as to reduce earnings management. Institutional 
ownership has the ability to reduce the incentives of selfish managers through an 
intense level of supervision. Institutional ownership has a significant influence on 
earnings management practices, the smaller the percentage of institutional 
ownership, the greater the manager's tendency to take certain accounting policies 
to manipulate earnings reporting. Midiastuty and Machfoedz’s (2003) research 
results show that institutional ownership negatively affects earnings management 
so that institutional ownership becomes an effective mechanism in overseeing 
manager performance. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Earnings management moderates the effect of institutional 
ownership on firm value in property & real estate companies on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Managerial ownership has succeeded in becoming a mechanism to reduce the 
agency problems of managers by aligning the interests of managers with 
shareholders. The interests of managers and external shareholders can be combined 
if the share ownership by the manager is enlarged so that the manager will not 
manipulate earnings for his benefit. In other words, a certain percentage of share 
ownership by management tends to influence earnings management actions. Cornet 
(2006) found a significant negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Earnings management moderates the effect of managerial ownership 
on firm value in property & real estate companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
The board of commissioners is assigned and given responsibility for 
overseeing the quality of information contained in the financial statements. 
Considering the importance of management to conduct earnings management that 
affects investor confidence, the role of the board of commissioners as supervisors 
is allowed to have access to company information. The board of commissioners has 
no authority in the company, so the board of directors is responsible for delivering 
information related to the company to the board of commissioners 
 
Hypothesis 7: Earnings management moderates the effect of the number of 
independent commissioners on firm value in the property & real estate sector 
companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
An audit committee is a committee formed by the board of commissioners to 
carry out supervisory duties for company management with earnings management 
as moderation. The audit committee has the primary responsibility to assist the 
board of commissioners in carrying out their responsibilities, especially with 
matters relating to company accounting policies, internal controls, and financial 
reporting systems. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Earnings management moderates the effect of the audit committee 
on firm value in the property & real estate sector companies on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
 
3. METHODS 
This type of research is included in the causal associative research. According 
to Erlina (2011), causal research is research that identifies causal relationships 
between various variables. The population in this study is the property & real estate 
company on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2018. For sampling that 
is representative of the population under study, a purposive sampling technique was 
used. In this study the sample was determined as many as 26 companies multiplied 
by 7 years so that the number of samples amounted to 182. 
To test the data used data analysis methods namely; descriptive statistical 
analysis, selection of estimation models (chow test, Hausman test, and Lagrange 
Multiplier test), and research hypothesis testing (regression analysis with panel 
data, simultaneous statistical tests (F), partial statistical tests (t), coefficient of 
determination tests (R2), and moderating test). 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. RESULTS 
1. The results of this F test indicate that the independent variables jointly 
(simultaneously) have a significant effect on the dependent variable that is 
firm value with a significant value of 0,000 <0.05. 
Variabel Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
X1 4.420012 0.917867 4.815526 0.0000 
X2 -0.946880 0.563500 -1.680357 0.0947 
X3 0.155306 0.055736 2.786460 0.0059 
X4 0.213546 0.101396 2.106046 0.0366 
 
2. The results of this t-test states that institutional ownership, the number of 
independent boards of commissioners and audit committees partially 
(individually) have a significant effect on firm value because the value of 
sig <0.05, while managerial ownership partially does not significantly affect 
firm value. 
3. The value of R Square (R2) is 0.212 which means 0.212 or (21.2%) 
independent variables, namely institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, the number of independent commissioners and audit committees 
are able to explain firm value. While the remaining 78.8% is described or 
explained by other variables not included in this research model. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     KI_MNL -0.375540 0.525720 -0.714334 0.4760 
KM_MNL 15.74776 18.51515 0.850534 0.3962 
DKI_MNL -0.002070 0.399003 -0.005188 0.9959 
KA_MNL 0.609844 0.690932 0.882639 0.3787 
     
      
4. From the results above, it can be concluded that the moderating variable that 
is earnings management cannot moderate between the variables x namely 
(institutional ownership, managerial ownership, independent board of 
commissioners, and audit committee) to the variable Y (firm value). 
 
4.2. DISCUSSION 
1. Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Value 
Institutional ownership has an important meaning in monitoring management 
because having institutional ownership will encourage increased oversight. 
Supervision carried out by institutional investors will guarantee the prosperity of 
shareholders. The effect of institutional ownership as a supervisory agent is 
suppressed through their sizable investment in the capital market. A high level of 
institutional ownership will lead to greater oversight efforts by institutional 
investors so that it can hinder the manager’s opportunistic behavior. Overall there 
are various parties involved in the implementation of good corporate governance 
consisting of shareholders, investors, employees, managers, suppliers and business 
partners, local communities, governments, business institutions, the media, and 
competitors. In this case the company must be able to accommodate the interests of 
these stakeholders. The greater the institutional ownership, the more efficient the 
use of company assets and is also expected to act as a deterrent to waste and 
manipulation of earnings carried out by management so that it can increase the 
value of the company. The results of this study the effect of institutional ownership 
on firm value proves that institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm value. 
With institutional ownership, the supervision function will run effectively and make 
management more careful in obtaining and managing loans (debts), which can 
result in a decrease in the value of the company. 
 
 
 
2. Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Value 
Managerial ownership is a situation where the manager owns the company’s 
shares or in other words the manager is also a shareholder in the company. In the 
financial statements, this situation is shown by the large percentage of company 
share ownership by managers. Managerial ownership will affect management 
performance in optimizing the company. This will have a positive effect on the 
survival of the company. Mechanisms to overcome agency conflicts within a 
company include increasing insider ownership. The increasing number of shares 
owned by managers through managerial ownership will motivate management's 
performance because they feel they have a stake in the company both in making 
decisions and are responsible for decisions taken because they participate as 
shareholders of the company so that management performance is getting better and 
affecting the increase in firm value. The results of this study state that managerial 
ownership does not have a positive and significant effect on firm value. 
 
3. Effect of Independent Board of Commissioners on Firm Value 
The increasing number of independent directors indicates that there will be 
an improved oversight and coordination function. The more members of the 
independent commissioner, the higher the level of integrity of the supervision of 
the board of directors produced, so that decisions to be taken by the board of 
directors are more representative of the interests of other stakeholders than the 
interests of the majority shareholders and the impact will be better on the value of 
the company. One strategy that companies can implement in implementing a good 
corporate governance system is to optimize the performance of the board of 
commissioners. Independent commissioners can increase the effectiveness of 
decision making, the time spent in decision making can be more efficient and the 
decisions taken have better quality so that it can attract investors and cause 
increased firm value. The results of this study stated that the number of independent 
commissioners has a positive effect on firm value. 
 
4. Effect of the Audit Committee on Firm Value 
The audit committee has a role in evaluating internal processes and controls 
in the company so as to produce quality reporting. This shows that the existence of 
the audit committee in the company contributes to the results of the quality of 
financial statements. The audit and evaluation function by the audit committee will 
reduce the level of management fraud and increase investor confidence in the 
company so that it will ultimately increase firm value. An audit committee was 
formed to assist the Board of Commissioners in carrying out supervisory activities. 
The audit committee is expected to reduce agency conflicts so that reports 
submitted to interested parties can be trusted so that they can help increase the value 
of the company in the eyes of investors because of increased investor confidence. 
The results of this study prove that the audit committee has a positive and 
significant effect on firm. 
 
 
5. Earning Management moderates the effect of Institutional Ownership on 
Firm Value 
Earnings management is interference in the process of preparing external 
financial reporting, with the aim of obtaining personal profit. Earnings management 
can reduce the credibility of financial statements if used for decision making, 
because earnings management is a form of manipulation of financial statements that 
are the target of communication between managers and external parties of the 
company. Earnings management is affected by conflicts of interest between the 
principal (shareholders) and the agents as managers (company management) that 
arise because each party tries to achieve or consider the level of prosperity that it 
wants. With the effect of institutional ownership in a company on firm value, then 
with earnings management will earnings management be able to weaken the effect 
of institutional ownership on firm value. Of course, with the existence of high 
earnings management practices, firm value will decrease, so that the effect of 
institutional ownership will also be increasingly weakened by the existence of 
earnings management as a moderating variable. However, in this study, this theory 
cannot be proven in property & real estate sector companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. In this research, partially earnings management is not able to 
significantly affect firm value. So that the ability of earnings management to 
weaken or strengthen the effect of institutional ownership is also very little so it is 
not significant. 
 
6. Earning Management moderates the effect of Managerial Ownership on 
Firm Value. 
Managerial ownership is ownership of shares by the company management. 
Managerial share ownership can align between the interests of shareholders and 
managers, because managers share directly the benefits of decisions taken and 
managers who bear the risk if there are losses that arise as a consequence of wrong 
decision making. It states that the greater the proportion of management ownership 
in companies 16 will be able to unite the interests of managers and shareholders, so 
that the company's performance is getting better. With the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm value, as well as elements of earnings management in the 
company, firm value will certainly be affected by it. However, in this study, this 
effect cannot be proven empirically because the research results show the opposite. 
Where earnings management cannot be used as a moderating variable in the effect 
of managerial ownership on firm value. So that the ability of earnings management 
to weaken or strengthen the effect of managerial ownership is also very little so it 
is not significant. 
 
7. Earning Management moderates the effect of the Number of Board of 
Commissioners on Firm Value 
The board of commissioners as the top of the company’s internal management 
system has a very important role in the company, especially in the implementation 
of good corporate governance. The board of commissioners is the core of corporate 
governance assigned to ensure the implementation of the company’s strategy, 
oversee management in managing the company, and requires accountability. In 
addition to having a role as management supervisor, the independent board of 
commissioners also has the role of providing advice to directors effectively and by 
ensuring that the company appoints executives and professional managers and also 
ensures that the principles and practices of good corporate governance are adhered 
to and implemented properly, so that later the company can increase firm value. So 
that the ability of earnings management to weaken or strengthen the effect of the 
independent board of commissioners is also very little so it is not significant. 
 
8. Earning Management moderates the effect of the Audit Committee on Firm 
Value 
Companies that have audit committee members will make the supervision of 
internal auditors in the company more stringent so as to prevent bad behavior from 
internal auditors. As an independent party, the audit committee is expected to play 
its role in overseeing the running of the company which is a form of good corporate 
governance to reduce agency problems. With the reduction in agency problems, this 
can later increase firm value. In addition, earnings management is an ability to 
manipulate the choices available and make the right choices to achieve the desired 
profit level. The existence of earnings management will certainly affect the quality 
of financial statements submitted by the company so that it will have an impact on 
the level of investor confidence and ultimately will reduce firm value. But the 
results in this study have not been able to prove this because in this study it was 
found that earnings management is not a moderating variable between the influence 
of the audit committee on the firm value. Then the ability of earnings management 
to weaken or strengthen the effect of the audit committee is also very little so it is 
not significant. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
5.1. Conclusions 
 The conclusions of this study include: 
1. Institutional ownership has a positive and significant effect on firm value 
in property & real estate companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 1 is accepted. 
2. Managerial ownership does not have a significant effect on firm value in 
property & real estate sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
3. The number of independent commissioners has a positive and significant 
effect on firm value in property & real estate companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 3 is accepted. 
4. The audit committee has a positive and significant effect on firm value in 
property & real estate sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 4 is accepted. 
5. Earnings management cannot moderate the effect of institutional 
ownership on firm value in property & real estate sector companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 5 is rejected. 
6. Earnings management cannot moderate the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm value in property & real estate companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 6 is rejected. 
7. Earnings management cannot moderate the effect of the number of 
independent commissioners on firm value in property & real estate sector 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 7 
was rejected. 
8. Earnings management cannot moderate the effect of the audit committee 
firm value on property & real estate companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. Thus Hypothesis 8 is rejected. 
 
5.2. Suggestions 
Based on the conclusions in this research, several suggestions can be made, 
which are as follows: 
1. In the research results it can be seen that institutional ownership, the 
number of independent commissioners and audit committees are able to 
have a significant effect on firm value in the property & real estate sector 
companies, moreover it can be seen that partially institutional ownership, 
the number of independent commissioners and audit committees has a 
positive effect on firm value so it is expected that companies in the 
property & real estate sector will continue to pay attention to the level of 
institutional ownership, the number of independent commissioners and 
audit committees held annually. Because with the increasing level of 
institutional ownership, the number of independent commissioners and 
audit committees will be able to increase firm value. 
2. Future studies are expected to re-examine the effect of other variables 
that can affect firm value in property & real estate companies listed on 
the IDX. Some variables that can be examined include leverage, 
liquidity, operating cash flow and so on. 
3. In the results of this study it can be seen that earnings management cannot 
be used as a moderating variable in the effect of institutional ownership, 
managerial ownership, the number of independent commissioners and 
audit committees on firm value in property & real estate companies listed 
on the IDX. So that in subsequent studies are expected to re-test earnings 
management in the research model whether as an independent variable 
or as an intervening variable. 
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